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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a final order of a Utah 
District Court may be appealed. Appellate jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court 
of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(a) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court correctly stay the Utah proceedings based upon its 
finding that, pursuant to UCA § 78-45c-207, Utah was an inconvenient forum? 
2. Did the trial court correctly order that the issues raised by the pending 
petition to modify be considered by the Court in King County, State of Washington? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Challenges to the trial court's interpretation and application of statutory law 
present questions of law: appellate review is for correctness, giving no particular 
deference to the lower court's conclusions. In Re E.H.H., 2000 UT App 368, f 6, 16 P.3d 
1257. 
A pretrial jurisdictional issue decided by the trial court to determine the 
appropriateness of exercising its continuing jurisdiction is a question of law and is 
reviewed under a correction of error standard, giving no particular deference to the trial 
courts determination. Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644, 646-647 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The determinative statutes cited herein are Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
45c-202 and 78-45c-207 (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT O F THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a Ruling and Order of the Honorable Bruce Lubeck, Third 
District Court, Summit County, State of Utah. Specifically, this is an appeal from the 
Third District Court's Ruling and Order staying the proceedings in the State of Utah and 
ordering that the matter be considered in the State of Washington. 
B. Course of the Proceedings & Disposition of the Case 
1. On November 8,1995 Appellee, Lara Young, filed a Verified Divorce 
Complaint seeking to terminate her marriage to Appellant, David Young, in Third 
District Court, Summit County, State of Utah. (R. at 1-11). 
2. The case was tried on November 26, 1996. (R. at 155; 171). 
3. The Decree of Divorce was entered on March 24, 1997. (R. at 171 -178). 
4. Appellee, Lara Young filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and 
Increase Child Support on August 12, 1998. (R. at 206-209). 
5. Appellant, David Young filed his Answer to the Petition to Modify Decree 
of Divorce and Increase Child Support on August 28, 1998. (R. at 218-225). 
6. A trial on the Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce was held on October 7, 
1998. (R. at 323.) 
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7. An Order Modifying Divorce Decree and Increasing Child Support was 
issued on November 2, 1998. (R. at 323-324). 
8. Appellant, David Young, filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce on 
May 5, 1999. (R. at 326-327). 
9. Appellee, Lara Young, filed her Answer to Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce on June 17, 1999. (R. at 328-330). 
10. On July 19, 1999 Appellee, Lara Young, filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment or in The Alternative, Motion to Dismiss [Petition to Modify Decree of 
Divorce]. (R. 334-335). 
11. On November 2, 1999 the trial Court dismissed Appellant, David Young's, 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce on the grounds that it was filed within six (6) 
months of the Order Modifying Divorcee Decree and that, at the time of the hearing, no 
genuine issue of material fact existed. (R. at 462-464). 
12. On April 3, 2000 Appellant, David Young, filed a second Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce. (R. at 481-483). 
13. Appeellee, Laura Young, filed an Affidavit in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss on September 29, 2000. (R. at 513- 516). 
14. Appellant's second Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce was dismissed on 
or about June 12, 2001. (R. at 532) 
15. On June 30, 2003 Appellant, David Young, filed a third Petition to Modify 
Decree of Divorce and Adoption of the Proposed Parenting Plan. (R. at 593-598). 
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16. On August 6, 2003 Appellee, Lara Young, filed a Petition for 
Modification/Adjustment of Custody Decree/Parenting Plan/Residential Schedule in 
King County Superior Court, State of Washington, Case No.: 03-3-09663 before the 
Honorable Helen L. Halpert, seeking enforcement of the Order Modifying Divorce 
Decree and Increasing Child Support as well as the remaining provisions of the Decree 
of Divorce. (R. at 856-864). 
17. Appellant, David Young, filed an Answer to the Petition for 
Modification/Adjustment of Custody Decree/Parenting Plan/Residential Schedule filed in 
King County Superior Court, State of Washington. (R. at 968). 
18. On August 11, 2003 Appellee, Lara Young, filed a Motion to Quash on the 
grounds that jurisdiction should be transferred to the State of Washington. (R. at 644-
646; 684-692). 
19. The Court heard oral arguments on Appellee, Lara Young's Motion to 
Quash on November 17, 2003, at which time that matter was taken under advisement. 
(R. at 964). 
20. Thereafter, on November 24, 2003 the Court discussed this matter with the 
Honorable Helen Halpert, King County Superior Court, State of Washington. (R. at 965, 
976). 
21. On November 25, 2004 the court issued its Ruling and Order and therein 
held, "these proceedings are STAYED [ ] and the matter is to be considered in 
Washington under petitioner's [Appellee's] petition to modify, the court finding this 
[Utah] is an inconvenient forum under UCA § 78-45c-207." (R. at 970). 
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22. This is an appeal from said final order granting Appellee, Lara Young's 
Motion to Quash. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
1. The parties are the parents of one minor child, to wit: Kayla MacKenzie 
Young, (hereinafter "Kayla") born on January 25, 1995. (R. at 2, 156). 
2. This case was tried on November 26, 1996 and the Decree of Divorce was 
entered on March 24, 1997. (R. at 155 - 170; 171-178). 
3. Pursuant to f 2 of the Decree of Divorce, the parties were awarded joint 
legal custody of Kayla and Appellee, Lara Young, was designated as her physical 
custodian. Appellant, David Young, was awarded liberal and reasonable visitation time 
with Kayla. (R. at 172). 
4. In 1999 Appellee, Lara Young, was promoted by Gap, Inc. She and Kayla 
relocated to the State of California. (R. at 648). 
5. In June 2002 Appellee, Lara Young, secured new employment at an 
increased salary and relocated to the State of Washington. (R. at 648). 
6. Kayla has lived in the State of Washington since June 2002. (R. at 648). 
7. Kayla's contacts are in the State of Washington. Specifically, Kayla is 
attending Carl Sandburg Elementary School: her schoolteachers and classmates are in 
the State of Washington. Her current and ongoing medical care is provided in the State 
of Washington: her pediatrician resides in the State of Washington. Kayla's babysitter 
and after-school care providers are in the State of Washington. (R. at 648). 
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8. Since 1999, Appellant, David Young, has exercised visitation with Kayla 
on approximately six (6) occasions. On these occasions, Kayla traveled to see Appellant 
in the State of Utah. (R. at 647 - 648). 
9. Since Appellee, Lara Young, and Kayla left the State of Utah in 1999, 
Appellant, David Young, has not traveled to either California or Washington see Kayla. 
(R. at 647-648). 
10. Paragraph 3 of the Decree of Divorce order of Appellant, David Young, to 
provide support of $136.00 per month for the benefit of Kayla. (R. at 173). 
11. Paragraph 1 of the Order Modifying Divorce Decree and Increasing Child 
Support orders Appellant, David Young, to provide support of $589.00 per month for the 
benefit of Kayla. (R. at 323). 
12. Appellant, David Young, has a child support arrearage of $5,219.55. (R. at 
648, 682). 
13. On August 6, 2003 Appellee, Lara Young, filed an action in the State of 
Washington, King County Superior Court, case number 03-3-09663-0 SEA before the 
Honorable Helen L. Halpert, seeking enforcement of the Decree of Divorce and the Order 
Modifying Divorce Decree. (R. at 686A; 856 - 864). 
14. Appellant, David Young, filed an Answer to the Petition for 
Modification/Adjustment of Custody Decree/Parenting Plan/Residential Schedule filed in 
King County Superior Court, State of Washington. (R. at 968). 
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15. This action and the action filed in King County Superior Court, State of 
Washington are the only litigation which Appellee, Lara Young, has knowledge of 
regarding custody of the parties' minor child. (R. at 649). 
16. Appellee, Lara Young currently has physical custody of Kayla: they reside 
in the State of Washington. (R. at 649). 
17. The parties in this action are the only parties that claim custody or visitation 
right with Kayla. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Adopted by Utah in 2000 as a complete replacement to the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) "was promulgated in an effort to clarify ambiguous 
provisions in the UCCJA and to rectify conflicting state interpretations of the UCCJA." 
Benson v. Benson, 667 N.W.2d 582, 584 (N.D. 2003). "The most significant changes in 
the UCCJEA are prioritizing home-state jurisdiction and providing for exclusive, 
continuing jurisdiction in the initial decree state." IcL 
Specifically, Section 202 of the UCCJEA clears up the confusion that was being 
caused by the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. §1738A. Codified 
as Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-202. The "PKPA requires other States to give full faith and 
credit to custody determinations made by the original decree State pursuant to the decree 
State's continuing jurisdiction so long as that State has jurisdiction under its own law and 
remains the residence of the child or any contestant." See UCCJEA, §202, comment 2, 
Appellant Brief Addendum B. 
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Section 207 of the UCCJEA "retains the focus of Section 7 of the UCCJA. It 
authorizes courts to decide that another State is in a better position to make the custody 
determination, taking into consideration the relative circumstances of the parties. If so, 
the court may defer to the other state." See UCCJEA, §207, cmt, Appellant Brief, 
Addendum B; codified at Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-207, citing 78-45c-7 (Repealed 
2000). However, there is one significant departure from the UCCJA: "the court shall 
stay the case and direct the parties to file in the State that has been found to be the more 
convenient forum. The court is also authorized to impose any other conditions it 
considers appropriate." See UCCJEA, §207, cmts, Appellant Brief] Addendum B. 
In this case, §§ 202 and 207 of the UCCJEA were correctly applied by the trial 
court as the applicable body of law governing this situation. First, the respondent filed a 
petition on June 30, 2003 to modify the decree after the UCCJEA statutory changes were 
adopted by Utah in 2000. Even if the filing date is determined to be the date of the 
divorce, November 8, 1995, the UCCJEA still applies because the applicable sections at 
issue in this case are procedural in nature, and can be applied retroactively. "A statute 
may be applied retroactively if it affects only procedural and not substantive rights." In 
Re T.M., 2003 UT App. 191, f 17, 73 P.3d 959, quoting Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Second, a court of this State conducted an initial child custody determination. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-201. Pursuant to f 2 of the Decree of Divorce, Appellee was 
granted the care, custody, and control of the party's minor child, Kayla. (R. 172). Based 
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on the initial child custody determination, this court has exclusive, continuing 
jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. 78-45c-202. 
Pursuant to the UCCJEA as adopted by Utah, the trial court continues to have 
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction until a court of this state determines that "neither the 
child, the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a 
significant connection with this state.. .or.. .the court determines that it is an inconvenient 
forum." Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-202(l-2). 
In this case, a Utah court has determined that there lacks a significant connection 
with this state, and that Utah is an inconvenient forum. (R. at 970). In making this 
determination, the Court discussed the case with the Honorable Helen L. Halpert, King 
County Superior Court, Washington, to determine whether Washington state "ought to 
have matters heard [] because its inconvenient or because there's no substantial 
connection with this state." (R. at 976). After a considerable discussion on the record, 
the Court determined that "it's inconvenient... [and] there simply isn't sufficient 
connection [in Utah] anymore to justify keeping it here, and I can allow it to go forward 
[in Washington]. (R. at 976). 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT UTAH WAS AN 
INCONVENIENT FORUM PURSUANT TO UCA § 78-45c-207. 
Under the UCCJEA, a "Utah court may choose to decline to exercise its 
jurisdiction, stay its proceedings, and defer to the jurisdiction of [another states court]." 
Liska at 648. Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, the court 
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shall consider all relevant factors, including: .. .[1] the length of time the 
child has resided outside this state; [2] the distance between the court in this 
state and the court in the State that would assume jurisdiction; [3] the 
relative financial circumstances of the parties; [4] any agreement of the 
parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction; [5] the nature and 
location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation, including 
the testimony of the child; [6] the ability of the court of each state to decide 
the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the 
evidence; and [7]the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and 
issues of the pending litigation. 
See also Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-207. 
In Liska, the commissioner "properly" recommended "that Utah decline to 
exercise its primary jurisdiction and defer to the jurisdiction of the Colorado court." 
Liska at 649-650. The commissioner found "evidence that is available to the Colorado 
court regarding the children's schooling, medical care, psychological evaluation, family 
and peer relationships is not available to this court." Id. Furthermore, "[b]ased on the 
continued residency of the children in Colorado.. .and the limited visitation exercised by 
the noncustodial parent who resides in Utah, Colorado has a close connection with the 
children at present." Id. 
The Liska considerations mandate that the State of Utah stay its case and defer the 
case to the State of Washington. Kayla's contacts are in the State of Washington. 
Indeed, Kayla left the State of Utah in 1999 and has not returned. (R. at 648). All 
current and relevant evidence necessary to determine her best interest is present in the 
State of Washington. Namely, Kayla's records for day care, preschool, and elementary 
school are in the State of Washington. Her friends, care takers, and health care providers 
reside in the State of Washington. (R. at 648). And, contrary to Appellant's position, 
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Kayla's infrequent contact with the State of Utah - six (6) visits over the last five (5) 
years - does not provide the basis necessary for the State of Utah to retain jurisdiction. 
(R. at 647-648). 
Without dispute, Washington is of a sufficient distance that requiring Appellee, 
Lara Young, and Kayla, and all required witness to travel to Utah, is considerably more 
inconvenient, and expensive than requiring one witness, Appellant, David Young, travel 
to the State of Washington. The financial burden is of significance in this case in that 
Appellant, David Young, has failed and refused to remain current in his child support 
obligation. His arrearage is $5,219.55. (R. at 648, 682). Notwithstanding Appellant's 
child support arrearages, Appellee, Lara Young, has provided consistent and reliable 
financial support for Kayla. To now require her to incur additional financial strain in 
travel expenditures and time off of work to come to Utah would be inequitable and 
unfair. Moreover, because the original Decree is silent as to the issue of retained 
jurisdiction, principals of equity and fairness should control. 
Finally, King County Superior Court has a family court division/department, such 
that the necessary evaluations can occur more quickly and with less expense than in Utah. 
Therefore, King County Superior Court is able to decide the issues more expeditiously. 
(R. at 976). And, while it is true the State of Utah has maintained this action since 1995, 
the relevant and necessary evidence regarding the best interest of Kayla is not longer 
available in the State of Utah. Indeed, the State of Utah's only claim to the case is based 
on the case's history. This is not and should not be the basis of jurisdiction. Without 
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dispute, the State of Washington is a more convenient forum notwithstanding that it will 
have to become familiar with the procedural and factual history of this case. 
Based on the forgoing factors, Utah is clearly the inconvenient forum in this 
matter. Therefore, in accordance with the UCCJEA purpose to "promote cooperation 
with the courts of other States to the end that a custody decree is rendered in the State 
which can best decide the case in the best interest of the child," the Utah court correctly 
stayed these proceedings, allowing Washington to exercise jurisdiction consistent with 
Appellee, Lara Young's Petition to Modify. See. UCCJEA, §101, cmt. (2), Appellant 
Brief, Addendum B. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY STAYED THE UTAH 
PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO UCA § 78-45c-202 AND DEFERRED 
THIS CASE TO THE STATE OF WASHINGTON. 
A court of this state that has made an initial child custody determination has 
exclusive and continuing jurisdiction to modify the child custody determination unless 
the court "determines that neither the child, the child and one parent, nor the child and 
person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state and that substantial 
evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships." Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-201, 202. 
The trial court in this case found that there no longer existed substantial evidence 
in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships. 
"[Kayla] has been in Washington since June, 2002.. .any records concerning the child in 
Utah would be at least 4 years old and the child is not yet nine years of age... [and] that 
the best interest of the child" is to stay the proceedings in Utah in favor of Washington. 
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(R. at 976). Further, there lacks any significant connection with Utah since Kayla has 
only returned to Utah six times to visit Respondent. (R. at 647-648). 
Based on the aforementioned analysis by the trial court, Utah lacks any substantial 
evidence concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships. 
Moreover, "the relationship between the child and the person remaining in the State with 
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction [is] so attenuated" that there no longer exists a 
substantial connection sufficient to warrant a court of this State to enforce jurisdiction. 
See UCCJEA, §202, cmt. 1, Appellant Brief, Addendum B. Therefore, the trial court 
correctly stayed these proceedings, allowing Washington to exercise jurisdiction over the 
petitioner's petition to modify. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Appellee, Lara Young prays that this Court uphold the Ruling and 
Order of the trial court staying any further action in the State of Utah on Appellant's 
Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and Adoption of the Proposed Parenting Plan on 
the grounds that the State of Utah is an inconvenient forum to determine or otherwise 
decide the issues presented therein and that the matter should be deferred to the State of 
Washington. 
DATED this ^ _ day of December, 2004. 
Nancy Mismash 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Petitioner and Appellee, was deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid on this 
[0 day of December, 2004. 
David Young 
Appellant - Pro Se 
P.O. Box 942 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Ph: 435-649-2197 
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Exhibit D Ruling and Order 
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A 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45c-202 
Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45C-204, a court of this state that 
has made a child custody determination consistent with Section 78-45c-201 or 78-
45c-203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until: 
(a) a court of this state determines that neither the child, the child and one parent, 
nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with 
this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state 
concerning the childfs care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or 
(b) a court of this state or a court of another state determines that neither the child, 
nor a parent, nor any person acting as a parent presently resides in this state. 
(2) A court of this state that has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this 
section may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the court determines that it is an 
inconvenient forum under Section 78-45c-207. 
(3) A court of this state that has made a child custody determination and does not 
have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that 
determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under 
Section 78-45C-201. 
Laws 2000, c. 247, $ 14, eff. July 1. 2000. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Uniform Law 
This section is similar to § 202 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act (1997). See Volume 9, Pt. IA Uniform Laws Annotated, Master 
Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw. 
B 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45c-207 
Inconvenient forum 
(1) A court of this state that has jurisdiction under this chapter to make a child 
custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it 
determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that a 
court of another state is a more appropriate forum. The issue of inconvenient 
forum may be raised upon the court's own motion, request of another court, or 
motion of a party. 
(2) Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this state 
shall consider whether it is appropriate that a court of another state exercise 
jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit 
information and shall consider all relevant factors, including: 
(a) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future 
and which state could best protect the parties and the child; 
(b) the length of time the child has resided outside this state; 
(c) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would 
assume jurisdiction; 
(d) the relative financial circumstances of the parties; 
(e) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction; 
(f) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending 
litigation, including the testimony of the child; 
(g) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the 
procedures necessary to present the evidence; and 
(h) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues of the pending 
litigation. 
(3) If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and that a 
court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the proceedings 
upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly commenced in 
another designated state and may impose any other condition the court considers 
just and proper. 
(4) A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter 
if a child custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another 
proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding. 
Laws 2000, c. 247. $ 19, cff. July 1, 2000. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Uniform Law 
This section is similar to § 207 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement Act (1997). See Volume 9, Pt. IA Uniform Laws Annotated, Master 
Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw. 
Prior Laws: 
Laws 1980, c. 41. 
C. 1953, § 78-45c-7. 
c 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARA 
DAVID 
YOUNG, 
YOUNG, 
vs 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. 954600158 
Transcript of: 
CHAMBERS/TELEPHONIC HEARING 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE BRUCE LUBECK 
Silver Summit District Court 
6300 North Silver Creek Drive 
Park City, UT 84098 
X>\AfL)cflft£ 
NOVEMBER 24, 2003 
TRANSCRIBED BY: ED MIDGLEY 
238-7533 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
HONORABLE BRUCE LUBECK 
Third District Court, Summit County 
State of Utah 
Silver Summit District Court 
6300 North Silver Creek Drive 
Park City, UT 84098 
Appearing in Utah Chambers 
HONORABLE HELEN L. HALPERT 
King County Superior Court 
State of Washington 
c/o 516 3rd Ave Rm W-1034 
Seattle, WA 98122 
Appearing Telephonically from Washington 
MR. HANSEN, Esquire 
for the Plaintiff in Washington 
Appearing Telephonically from Washington 
• * • 
(Whereupon, the following proceedings were had in 
open court:) 
JUDGE LUBECK: Let me put you on speaker, too, if I 
may. Are you there, Judge? 
JUDGE HALPERT: Yes, and in court with me is Mr. 
Hansen, who represents the mother in Washington; is that 
correct? 
MR. HANSEN: That's correct. 
JUDGE LUBECK: All right, let me -- I!11 just make my 
record. I am in my office; no one is here. And I have a 
digital recording system, so that's why I!ve put you on 
speakerphone. But no one's here. But it will only record in 
that way. 
And if I may, just for the record in this case, it's 
Lara Young versus David Young, Case Number 954600158. And in 
the case here, if I may, the Respondent, Mr. Young, has filed a 
motion to -- petition to modify the decree that was entered 
back in 1997. There have actually been a couple of petitions, 
in '98 and '99, and 2000. But this is one that was filed June 
30 of this year here in Summit County. 
And he requested temporary orders, and I've had a 
hearing scheduled for August 11. And on that very date, the 
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the summons and asked, 
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erroneously, under the "UCCJA," that this matter be handled up 
there in Washington. And I — we didn't do anything on the 
11th because we just got her pleading that day, and I allowed 
Mr. Young to respond. He's done that. 
We then had a hearing last week, or a couple of weeks 
ago, on November 17, and I talked to Judge Halpert off the 
record just about scheduling this hearing. 
And we scheduled this to discuss, under the UCCJEA, 
whether or not this state, being -- having original, exclusive 
jurisdiction, ought to have matters heard up there because it's 
inconvenient or because there's no substantial connection with 
this state. 
So, as I see it, from this perspective, Judge, that's 
where we are, and the purpose of this conversation. 
JUDGE HALPERT: I would agree there is — I don't — 
Mr. Hansen doesn't know if this is his problem or not. He 
wrote me a letter, which I got Friday, which explains Mom's 
position. I believe I asked that it also be faxed to you; I 
think my bailiff might have done that. 
JUDGE LUBECK: Yes. And I did receive that. 
JUDGE HALPERT: But Mr. Hansen was relying on Utah 
counsel to serve Mr. Young and we had no idea whether that 
happened. 
JUDGE LUBECK: Correct. I don't have anything that 
indicates whether it did or didn't. 
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MR. HANSEN: (Inaudible) 
JUDGE HALPERT: So, having said that, had Mr. Young 
had notice of this, he could have been in your court; correct? 
JUDGE LUBECK: No. He didn?t have notice from us of 
this. No, I didn't intend for either party to be here, to be 
part of this; at least I didnft set it up that way. If you 
think it should be, we can do that, but no, he did not have 
notice of this, and to my knowledge neither did Lara Young!s 
attorney here in Utah. 
JUDGE HALPERT: What — this is how I construe the 
case: that in fact Utah does have continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction as a matter of law, but that the child lives in 
Washington and it makes much more sense to do the action here, 
on a forum-inconvenient basis. Is that — 
JUDGE LUBECK: No, I mean and that!s, as I see under 
the law, what we!re talking about. Again, we don!t do a lot of 
these here. This is a county outside of Salt Lake, and we have 
a lot of divorces, but Irm not experienced in these, these 
UCCJEA things. But yes, that!s the situation. She 
evidently — I think itfs pretty clear that the mother and the 
child left Utah, and I'm not exactly sure when, but at some 
point in 1999. So, they've been gone at least four and perhaps 
pushing five years, depending on when they left. 
The father was here and has remained here; has been 
here for 27 years or something. And so his filings, which are 
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voluminous and long, are to the extent that she, the mother, 
has just been moving around. The fact that she's in Washington 
now is a mere fortuity -- this is his position; I'm not 
advocating it — that she moves around for work and for 
boyfriends and just happened to have landed in Washington 
because a boyfriend is there now, and she is as likely to leave 
next week as she is next month, and that's basically his 
position; being sort of casual about it. 
That she's lived in five jurisdictions — four 
jurisdictions in five years, and there are sufficient ties here 
to do it. 
Clearly, she I believe at age 4 didn't go to school 
here and hasn't been here since 1999. And, really, I think 
there's no question about that. So, whatever school records 
there are certainly aren't going to be here, and I don't know 
what may be there. I understand from the pleadings she's been 
there since June of 2002, so about a year and-a-half, and I 
assume the child is in school there. I don't know what else 
would be there, other than school records; and the bodies, of 
course. 
JUDGE HALPERT: Certainly, from my perspective, it 
would be easier to do it here since the child is here, because 
an evaluator could spend some time observing the child; a 
parenting evaluator. 
JUDGE LUBECK: Right. 
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JUDGE HALPERT: So, I don't know what your call is on 
this. I would be perfectly happy to retain this case and to 
have Utah decide to bow out on this one. But I do think, as a 
matter of law, it is your call, Judge Lubeck. 
JUDGE LUBECK: Well, again, I want to make sure you 
agree with that. That's, frankly, the way I see it. I can 
decide that it's either -- like I say — it's inconvenient, or 
— and maybe it's not completely separate, but in my mind 
they're kind of separate — but there simply isn't sufficient 
connection here anymore to justify keeping it here, and I can 
allow it to go forward there. 
So, if you agree with that, I'm not sure that — I'll 
be glad to talk to them — but I just need to make that 
decision. And I would -- I think, frankly, I would prefer to 
re-read the statutes to make sure I'm on solid footing. 
But is there anything else that you can think of that 
would weigh in to this decision, where this ought to happen? 
JUDGE HALPERT: I think the key is, I saw the 
pleadings that Mom filed in Utah. We do have — I don't know 
what your evaluation services are in Utah. King County, we 
have quite good family court services, and there could be a 
low-cost evaluation done here. And you all may have that, too. 
But that's just another factor. 
JUDGE LUBECK: So, you are a family court? 
JUDGE HALPERT: Yes. 
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JUDGE LUBECK: Okay. And I!m not; I!m a court of 
general jurisdiction. I do everything here; the only judge in 
the county. But we do indeed have a large number of 
evaluators, but they — it's just a question of normally the 
parties agree, and, if they don't, the court selects one, and 
we have a rule that sets the time limits and so on. But it's a 
competitive market and so it's really a — there isn't a — I 
wouldn't say that many of them are low cost. But they vary a 
little bit. But they're reasonably expensive. 
So, it may be that you have a better system in place. 
I don't think ours is deficient in any way, but I think a 
family court — we don't have a family court in Utah at all. 
But it's my understanding that that would probably be better 
than what we have. 
JUDGE HALPERT: I do want to clarify: King County 
Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction. 
JUDGE LUBECK: Right. But you have a — 
JUDGE HALPERT: Administratively, we divide up, and 
my assignment at this point is family court for two years. 
JUDGE LUBECK: Okay. Good. That's what I assumed it 
was. Okay. 
JUDGE HALPERT: So, are you just going to issue a 
written order; is that your — 
JUDGE LUBECK: I think that's — i n this, I think I'd 
rather have that record, and just do a brief minute entry, a 
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ruling and order with the background and say Ifm going to keep 
it here or send it there, and get that to you in the next day 
or so. I!m not sure that we have a mailing address, but I 
imagine our clerks have exchanged fax numbers or something. 
But — 
JUDGE HALPERT: Why donf t you get that to us . 
JUDGE LUBECK: All right. And If11 just do a ruling 
and order saying it seems to me that itfs better that it go one 
place or the other and do that. And, again, I wonft delay on 
that; I'm sure I can get that out in the next day or two. 
JUDGE HALPERT: That would be great. 
JUDGE LUBECK: All right. Anything else, Judge? I 
appreciate this time with you. Anything else you think we need 
to talk about? 
JUDGE HALPERT: I don't think it's a legally hard 
case. I mean, I don't think Mr. Hansen is arguing that 
Washington be the home state for modification; he's arguing 
that it makes more sense to have it here, but not — I don't 
think anyone disagrees as to what the law is, and that it is 
your choice. 
JUDGE LUBECK: Okay. 
JUDGE HALPERT: Thank you very much. 
JUDGE LUBECK: Very well. Thank you, Judge. 
JUDGE HALPERT: Bye. 
JUDGE LUBECK: Bye. 
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(Whereupon, the instant proceedings came to a close.) 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, Ed Midgley, an Official Court Reporter in and for 
the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
proceedings, recorded via digital audio at the time of their 
occurrence, were subsequently reduced by me, incident to 
assignment, to printed transcript form as hereinbefore 
appearing; 
That I was not present at any of the proceedings 
hereinbefore represented/. 
But that said transcription, so reduced, constitutes 
a true and correct transcription of testimony given, evidence 
adduced and/or proceedings had as appearing upon said digital 
audio record, to the best of my ability so to transcribe. 
To which certification I hereby set my hand this 3rd 
day of December, 2003, at Sa] 
Ed Midgley 
Ol/iAVruJc, 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARA YOUNG, 
vs. 
DAVID YOUNG, 
Petitioner, 
Respondent. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 954600158 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: November 25, 200 3 
The above matter came before the court on November 17, 2003 
for oral argument on Petitioner's motion to quash. Petitioner was 
present through Nancy Mismash, and Respondent was present without 
counsel, representing himself. 
BACKGROUND 
The parties in this case were divorced March 25, 1997. One 
child was"born to the parties in 1995. There were several 
petitions to modify. A petition to modify was filed August 12, 
1998 by petitioner. A petition to modify was filed May 5, 1999, 
by respondent. Respondent filed another petition on April 3, 
2000. The parties have been given joint physical custody. 
On June 30, 2003, respondent filed this petition to modify 
the decree, seeking custody, alleging petitioner has created an 
unstable environment for the child, with petitioner moving 
several times, living in 4 jurisdictions in the past 5 years. He 
supported it with a lengthy affidavit setting forth petitioner's 
moves, residences, vehicles, boyfriends, and other information 
about her alleged instability. He asserts she moved to 
Washington in June, 2002, where she remains, after having left 
Utah with the child in 1999, thence to California, thence to 
Washington in June, 2002. He filed a proposed parenting plan as 
well, and sought temporary relief. A hearing was scheduled and 
held August 11, 2003. 
On August 1, 2003, petitioner filed a motion in King County, 
Washington, to modify custody, arguing that Washington was the 
home state of the child and Washington should entertain the 
petition and child custody issues. On a date unknown, respondent 
in this action filed a response in Washington. 
On August 11, 2003, petitioner filed the present motion to 
quash arguing that under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act (UCCJA) this court did not have jurisdiction, but that the 
matter should be heard in Washington. The court continued the 
matter to allow respondent to respond, which he did with 
supporting attachments on September 11, 2003. Petitioner filed 
no reply but filed a notice to submit September 15, 2003. Oral 
argument was held November 17, 2003. 
The court determined that the UCCJEA, rather than the UCCJA 
as asserted by petitioner, is the applicable body of law 
governing this situation. The court ruled that it would take the 
matter under advisement and contact the court in Washington and 
then make a ruling as to whether Utah should retain jurisdiction 
or whether it should find this an inconvenient forum because 
there were no substantial ties to Utah with the child and one 
parent being in another state. The court contacted the Honorable 
Helen Halpert on November 17, 2003. The off-the-record 
conversation was solely and exclusively about identifying the 
case in each jurisdiction and the parties, and scheduling a 
future discussion for an on-the-record discussion. The merits of 
the cases were not discussed in any manner. It was determined 
that the clerks of the two courts would talk in the next couple 
of days and schedule a time convenient for both courts when a 
recorded discussion could take place. On November 18, 2003, that 
discussion was scheduled for Nove'mber 24, 2003. 
The court has now discussed the matter with the Honorable 
Helen Halpert on the record. That conversation will be ordered 
transcribed and provided to the parties as soon as available. 
DISCUSSION 
The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the 
entire file, and heard oral argument, concludes as follows. 
Under the UCCJEA, UCA 78-45c-101 et.seq., this court has 
continuing exclusive jurisdiction until this court determines 
there is not a significant connection with Utah and that 
substantial evidence is no longer available in this state 
concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships. If this court so determines it has exclusive, 
continuing jurisdiction, it may also decline jurisdiction if it 
determines this is an inconvenient forum. UCA 78-45c-202. This 
state is inconvenient if another state is more appropriate forum, 
and the court shall consider all relevant factors, including 
those listed in UCA 78-45c-207, which include prior domestic 
violence, the length of time the child has resided outside of 
Utah, the distance between this court and Washington's court, the 
relative financial circumstances of the parties, any agreement of 
the parties, the nature and location of the evidence required to 
resolve the pending litigation (including testimony of the 
child), the ability of the court of each state to decide the 
issue expeditiously, and the familiarity of the court of each 
state with the facts and issues of the pending litigation. If 
this court determines it is an inconvenient forum, it may stay 
this proceeding on condition that the child custody proceeding 
proceed in Washington. 
Thus, the court believes there are two reasons why it could 
decline jurisdiction. The first is under 78-45c-202, if the 
court concludes there are not sufficient connection with this 
state and substantial evidence is no longer available here. The 
second and distinct reason it may decline jurisdiction is because 
the court finds the forum inconvenient, after weighing the 
statutory factors. 
In this case the parties were married in this jurisdiction 
in 1992, and one child was born in Utah in 1995. The parties 
divorced in 1997. The mother, petitioner, and the child moved 
from Utah in 1999 to California, and now live in Washington. 
Respondent has remained in Utah. Respondent has evidently 
attempted more involvement in the life of his daughter. He 
claims petitioner is unstable in residence, employment, and 
relationship and the child's best interest is for both parents to 
be in this jurisdiction under an agreed parenting plan. 
The child was not in school before she left Utah in 1999, 
being only 4 years old at that time. It is not in the record 
exactly what schools she has been attending, when she started, 
nor where all the records are. She has been in Washington since 
June, 2002. 
Overall, the court believes that the proceedings in this 
jurisdiction should be stayed while the matter proceeds in 
Washington. The child is there, and though the UCCJEA does not 
reflect that the best interest of the child is a weighty 
consideration, it is to this court. The court in Washington has 
a family court division or department and evaluations can occur 
more quickly and with less expense than in Utah. Any records 
concerning the child in Utah would be at least 4 years old and 
the child is not yet nine years of age. Travel to Utah by the 
mother and child is more inconvenient than travel to Washington 
by one person, respondent. 
These proceedings are STAYED in Utah and the matter is to be 
considered in Washington under petitioner's petition to modify, 
the court finding this is an inconvenient forum under UCA 78-45c-
207. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED this day of_y_V _, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
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